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1. Introduction  
 
South Africa faces a severe problem of persistent structural unemployment. This 
results not only from low growth but more importantly from the pattern of 
growth over many decades. The recent recession aside, there has for the past 
several years been a significant improvement in South Africa‟s growth 
performance. However, although new jobs have been created, this has been at a 
frustratingly slow pace and it would be difficult to argue that there has been a 
structural shift to a more labour demanding growth path. The data remain 
controversial but even the more optimistic projections show that very large scale 
unemployment will remain a major problem even under quite optimistic growth 
scenarios. If it were not for increased social payments, poverty would have 
continued to increase over the period.  
 
Employment creation is a key objective of government policy. All the major 
policy initiatives since 1994 emphasise this problem. It was central to the RDP, 
to GEAR and remains a core component of ASGISA. Recent policy statements 
have placed a major new emphasis on an employment intensive growth path. 
These include the 2010 Budget, the DTI‟s Industrial Policy Action Plan (DTI, 
2010) and the statements released by the Minister of Economic Development. 
This is to be welcomed but as yet there is limited clarity as to what it actually 
means in practice.   
 
The objective of this paper is to explore the role of industrial policy in the 
context of South Africa‟s chronic unemployment problem and the stated policy 
emphasis on labour absorbing growth. It should be stated at the outset that 
industrial policy is by no means the only component of a policy package to 
encourage a more labour absorbing growth path. For instance, one issue which is 
not considered here is whether manufacturing should receive the high level of 
support that it does in relation to other (more labour intensive) sectors such as 
agriculture. Nevertheless, industrial policy clearly has an important role to play.   
 
Section two asks what should be different about industrial policy in the South 
African context of massive structural unemployment. The starting point is that 
while more rapid economic growth is an important objective, at any given level 
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of growth, the economy needs to become more labour demanding. The central 
question posed, therefore, is whether it is feasible to bring about changes in the 
economic structure and pattern of development, which would lead to a more 
rapid increase in labour absorption.   
 
Section three then goes on to examine the link between industrial policy and 
capital intensive development. Pre-1994, the weight of support was strongly in 
favour of investment in capital- and energy-intensive enterprises. With the 
advent of democracy, government set a multiplicity of objectives but de facto 
there was a surprising level of continuity in the ongoing assistance for heavy 
industry. It is, therefore, to be expected that „traditional‟ export sectors have 
continued to expand and that there has been relatively little diversification into 
non-traditional manufactured exports.  
 
Section four concludes. We argue that the ongoing bias in favour of heavy 
industry has been damaging, not only for employment but also for growth. South 
Africa‟s industrial policy has been fairly interventionist but in the wrong 
direction. It has acted to strengthen competitive advantage in resource-based, 
capital intensive sectors of manufacturing and undermined the prospects of more 
labour demanding sectors. Industrial policy needs to shift away from direct or 
indirect assistance to more capital intensive sectors and should be used to 
actively promote more labour demanding sectors and sub-sectors.  
 
 
2. The growth path, competitive advantage and 
the role of industrial policy  
 
Moving to a more labour demanding growth path means generating higher 
levels of employment per unit of output. This can be measured by the gross 
output elasticity of employment (GOEE), or the ratio of growth in employment 
to growth in output (Khan, 2007). A rising GOEE could be achieved in two 
main ways. Firstly, existing economic activities could become more labour 
intensive or, secondly, there could be a shift in the composition of output to 
relatively labour intensive sectors. The first shift may occur as a result of a 
change in relative factor prices or a change in firm (and farm) size with more 
small firms (and farms) and a larger informal sector. The second could be 
achieved via more rapid growth in labour- as opposed to capital-intensive 
sectors (e.g. agriculture relative to manufacturing) or sub-sectors (e.g. garments 




Comparative advantage and industrial policy 
 
Comparative advantage is not simply a matter of initial endowments but 
develops over time. Changes in comparative advantage could be market driven 
or be shaped by government policy, including industrial policy. Proponents of 
strong industrial policy have argued for „getting prices wrong‟ to accelerate 
industrial development and growth in general (Amsden, 1989). The „prices‟ 
Amsden is referring to here include the exchange rate and cost of capital and in 
her conception includes selective interventions to support some sectors above 
others.  
 
But there is also the question of what industrial policy is endeavouring to 
achieve. Generally it is conceived of as a way of encouraging structural change 
or a move up the technological ladder, for example from agriculture to industry, 
or the promotion of diversification into non-traditional sectors and the 
promotion of high technology sectors. In East Asia, for example, industrial 
policy is generally regarded as having been successful in leading firms to rapidly 
move into more advanced sectors. From a more neoclassical perspective, Lin 
(2009) cautions against strategies that defy comparative advantage by 
supporting activities which are too capital or skill intensive. It is, however,  
important to note that industrial policy played a key role in initially creating 
competitive advantage in labour intensive, export industries in East Asia which 
was the reason that high GOEE‟s were achieved in these high growth sectors. 
This underpinned the dramatic success in poverty reduction in countries such as 
Taiwan, Korea and, more recently, Vietnam (Khan, 2007).   
 
 





The evolution of industrial policy 
 
At the time of the transition to democracy there was intense debate about the 
nature of the problem of slow industrial expansion as well as of the policies 
needed to address this (Hirsch, 2005). World Bank analysts characterised the 
South African economy as a protected and distorted economy of the Latin 
American type, resulting from apartheid policies compounding an import 
substituting industrialisation strategy (Fallon and Pereira da Silva, 1994; Levy, 
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 This section draws heavily on Black and Roberts (2009) from where further detail on the 
evolution and impact of industrial policy can be obtained.  
4 
1992). According to Levy (1992) the bias to capital-intensity further resulted 
from the nature of government investment support. The Bank‟s 
recommendations to redress this situation were trade liberalisation, a reduction 
of distortions in factor markets and a stable macroeconomic environment, and 
the „right‟ prices to provide an enabling environment to stimulate exports 
(Fallon and Pereira da Silva, 1994).  
 
The analysis of the problem put forward by the influential Industry Strategy 
Project (ISP) was not that dissimilar although their prescriptions focused more 
on „supply-side‟ support and industrial policy interventions (Joffe et al., 1995). 
The ISP was also highly critical of the high degree of concentration and 
resultant lack of competition in many industrial sectors. Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996) offered a somewhat different perspective, arguing that the dominance of 
the large scale mineral-based industry that comprised South Africa‟s „minerals 
energy complex‟ should be the starting point for an understanding of industrial 
development and appropriate industrial policy.  
 
The ISP and World Bank interpretations prevailed in terms of stated policy, 
although, in practice, policy sought to promote a multiplicity of objectives, with 
international competiveness as a central theme. While objectives included 
support for non-mineral based sub-sectors and higher value added activities, it 
was understood that mineral based manufacturing would remain important and 
should be supported by further beneficiation (Hirsch, 2005: 124). 
 
Trade liberalisation was also an important element. Some liberalisation had 
already taken place by the early 1990s. This included a reduction in quantitative 
controls on imports, the beginnings of tariff reduction and significant 
privatisation. After 1994 the liberalisation programme involved removing 
remaining quantitative restrictions, simplifying the tariff schedule and a 
significant reduction in average tariff rates. The impact was to reduce effective 
rates of protection substantially, from a weighted average of 35 per cent on 
manufactured goods in 1984 to 12.9 per cent in 2000 and then to 9.5 per cent in 
2006 (Edwards and Lawrence, 2008).   
 
A range of measures were also introduced to encourage investment, 
technological improvements and exports, and to support small firms. These have 
included sector specific adjustment programmes, investment incentives, „supply-
side‟ incentive programmes, subsidised infrastructure, support measures for 
skills development and technology, special loan facilities and support 
programmes for small firms (Black and Roberts, 2009).  
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The government‟s concerns about international competitiveness were re-focused 
on enhancing capabilities in „knowledge-intensive‟ activities and advanced 
technology, with the release in 2002 and 2003 of the National Research and 
Development Strategy, the Integrated Manufacturing Strategy and the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology Strategy (DST, 2002; NACI/DST, 2003; DTI, 2002). 
These were followed in 2007 by the National Industrial Policy Framework 
(DTI, 2007) and most recently the Industrial Policy Action Plan (DTI, 2010) 
which has introduced an ambitious agenda of policy interventions to stimulate a 
wide array of priority sectors and activities.  
 
There has, therefore, been no shortage of industrial policy interventions and new 
programmes, but the net impact is far from clear. Together with trade 
liberalisation, it was expected that these measures would counteract the previous 
government‟s support for large-scale capital-intensive industries and the legacy 
of poor productivity, and would facilitate the development of non-traditional 
manufactured exports (Hanival and Hirsch, 1998; Joffe et al., 1995). However, 
this has only happened to a very limited degree. While the stated objective of 
policy has been to encourage higher value-added manufacturing, labour-
intensive activities and smaller firms, in practice the weight of support has 
continued to be focused on larger scale, capital-intensive firms and sub-sectors.  
 
 
Capital intensity and comparative advantage 
 
Assuming no large scale state intervention, the (tradable) sectors which are 
likely to expand most rapidly will be those with a growing comparative 
advantage. So the question then arises as to the nature of South Africa‟s 
comparative advantage and what role, if any, industrial policy should have in 
trying to influence this.   
 
One measure is to consider revealed comparative advantage. Policy since 1994 
has placed considerable emphasis on becoming competitive to promote exports 
and was a central objective behind trade liberalisation, for instance. Attempts to 
develop competitive non-traditional exports especially in relatively labour 
intensive sectors have been generally unsuccessful. Large scale, labour intensive 
exports did not materialize. In fact, certain labour intensive sectors have instead 
proven very vulnerable to import competition. While exports have grown, they 
have not led to the expected jobs bonanza. Instead, productivity rose rapidly as 
firms slimmed down and became more competitive. So tariff reductions and a 
weaker currency supported export growth but it turned out that there was a high 
degree of path dependence with continued expansion taking place in capital 
intensive „traditional‟ sectors such as basic chemicals, steel and other basic 
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metals. These sectors represented South Africa‟s „revealed comparative 
advantage‟. One of the most important exceptions, the rapid growth in 
automotive exports, was driven by export incentives under the Motor Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP) introduced in 1995 (Black and Bhanisi, 
2007). So South Africa‟s „revealed‟ comparative advantage was, somewhat 
paradoxically, in relatively capital intensive products and not in labour intensive 
products. While the economy has significant pockets of sophisticated 
technological capability and skills, there is also a very large, unskilled group and 
massive open unemployment but at the same time no apparent comparative 
advantage in labour intensive production.  
 
However, to conclude that South Africa cannot compete in more labour 
demanding sectors is problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the reality is 
that South Africa competes in a number of different and sometimes 
„contradictory‟ spheres reflecting a differentiated factor endowment. These 
include sectors based on its natural resource endowment in minerals and certain 
agricultural commodities, on capital or energy intensive, large scale industrial 
processing, on skills and high technology in certain niche markets and based on 
low wages in a range of labour intensive areas ranging from clothing to tourism. 
In other words, South Africa already competes in labour intensive sectors and it 
is of critical importance for employment that we strengthen our competitiveness 
in this area.   
 
The second reason is that South Africa‟s revealed comparative advantage has 
been fundamentally distorted in three main ways. Firstly, capital and energy 
subsidies have increased the profitability of capital- and energy- intensive 
beneficiation projects in particular. Secondly, market power and the pricing of 
raw and semi-processed materials have conspired against more labour 
demanding sub-sectors and, thirdly, the ongoing skills crisis has limited 
competiveness especially in more labour demanding sectors. These are 
elaborated on below.  
 
 
Support for heavy industry  
 
The trend towards a reduced share for mining in the economy coupled with trade 
liberalisation might have been expected to herald a new industrial development 
trajectory, with the growth of more broad-based manufacturing. However, a 
striking feature since 1994 has been the continued rapid growth of resource 
based (and capital-intensive) industries. Growth in these sectors, and in the 
automotive industry, has far outstripped other sectors of manufacturing.   
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A similar pattern is evident in the composition of merchandise exports. Trade 
liberalisation was followed by rapid growth of international trade in both exports 
and imports, but exports remain dominated by minerals and resource-intensive 
manufactured products (Roberts, 2007). Apart from a dip in 1999 and 2000, 
minerals, basic metals, basic chemicals and pulp & paper have maintained a 
share of around 60 per cent of total merchandise exports since 1994.  
 
The share of non-traditional exports did expand from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s with annual growth rates in excess of 20 per cent in sectors such as motor 
vehicles, electrical machinery, transport equipment, leather products, beverages, 
rubber products, printing and publishing and footwear over the period 1988 to 
1996 (Black and Kahn, 2002). However, the base was extremely low for many 
of these products. Much of this expansion was into Africa, coinciding with 
political acceptability and the ending of sanctions. Africa‟s share of South 
Africa‟s total exports excluding gold increased from just 9.1 per cent in 1988 to 
17.9 per cent in 1996. But the diversification of South Africa‟s exports has 
effectively stalled, aside from automotive exports. Edwards and Lawrence 
(2008) show that non-automotive manufactured exports fell in volume terms by 
3.3 per cent per annum from 2000 to 2005.  
 
The growth of resource-based sectors of manufacturing has been on the back of 
cheap (coal-based) energy and government support to exploit linkages within the 
„minerals-energy complex‟ (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). For example, 
aluminium production which dominates non-ferrous metals is based entirely on 
low priced electricity to process imported bauxite. Cheap electricity has been a 
function not just of abundant coal resources, but also the extraordinary 
electricity pricing policy. Massive over investment in electricity capacity in the 
1970s and early 1980s by the state owned utility, Eskom, led government to set 
extremely low tariffs to attract huge investments in a series of metal processing 
plants. In the past this was justified by a large excess generation capacity 
resulting from the earlier over-investment. However, even with capacity running 
out, agreements were being reached in 2007 with Alcan for an aluminium 
smelter, reportedly at an electricity price around US$0.02/kWh or R0.14, 
compared with average prices of R0.18 for other industrial users and R0.45 for 
households (Black and Roberts, 2009).  The severe constraints on South Africa‟s 
generation capacity led to these plans for the smelter investment being cancelled 
in late 2009.  
 
In effect, the electricity pricing structure has exacerbated the impact that South 
Africa‟s natural resource endowment has on the pattern of trade discussed 
above. While there have not been any analyses of the country‟s trade 
performance which properly take this into account, the reported statistics on the 
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cancelled Alcan smelter project offer a graphic illustration. The R21bn 
greenfield investment would have employed just 800 people, with the product 
expected to be almost entirely exported in primary form.  
 
Direct state support for basic metals production was further provided in the form 
of Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) finance for aluminium and 
stainless steel plants into the 1990s, through state ownership of the main steel 
producer until 1989, and in the provision of infrastructure over recent decades 
(Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). Much of the IDC finance in the second half of the 
1990s continued to be oriented to large, capital-intensive, resource-based 
activities. The IDC has only more recently increased the emphasis on 
employment creation. Similarly, the basic chemicals sector is dominated by 
Sasol, which was initially a state corporation. Its capabilities are derived from 
huge state financing of its synthetic fuel-from-coal operations which were 
established for strategic reasons as a result of the sanctions threat (Levy, 1992; 
Rustomjee et al., 2007). 
 
The paper and paper products sector is reliant on timber and has historically 
benefitted from the apartheid government‟s policies with regard to land and 
water resources for extensive afforestation. The large paper mills of the two 
dominant producers, Sappi and Mondi, are also capital and energy intensive. It 
is notable that South Africa exports around one-third of the pulp produced in the 
country for processing elsewhere (Genesis, 2005). 
 
Some of the very substantial support programmes provided by government have 
reinforced rather than altered the industrial development path. An accelerated 
depreciation allowance under the 37E incentive was given to major resource-
based projects in the 1990s such as Columbus Stainless Steel and Saldanha 
Steel. The Strategic Industrial Projects programme provided tax relief 
equivalent to R7.7bn from 2002 to 2005 for large capital-intensive projects 
many of which are in basic metals and basic chemicals (including four projects 
undertaken by Sasol) (Black and Roberts, 2009).  
 
The pattern of performance suggests the importance of previous government 
policies, and „path dependent‟ factors, meaning that firms which have developed 
productive strengths are better able to re-invest and continue to grow. Perhaps 
the best example of this is the chemicals giant, Sasol, which leads local industry 
in ongoing R&D spending. The basic chemicals sector which is dominated by 
Sasol also has the highest investment rates, with levels approximately 50 per 
cent of value added in the years 2003 to 2007. Investment rates averaging 
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around 40 per cent of value added have also been maintained in the basic iron & 
steel, non-ferrous metals and coke & petroleum sub-sectors.  
 
Market power and input pricing 
 
The market power of large upstream producers in sectors such as steel and 
chemicals has profoundly disadvantaged more labour intensive downstream 
production. Downstream development in sectors such as steel and chemicals has 
been hindered by the market power of large, upstream producers such as Iscor 
(now Arcelor-Mittal) and Sasol. The lack of competition has enabled them to 
use import parity pricing, meaning that local fabricators have derived little 
advantage from low production costs of material such as steel, aluminium and 
basic chemicals (Roberts and Rustomjee, 2009). This is in spite of the fact that 
beneficiaries of the 37E tax incentive undertook to set prices at a level which did 
not lead to higher returns from domestic sales than exports. In similar fashion 
the potentially labour demanding plastics sector has been rendered 
uncompetitive by the pricing on inputs derived from large firms such as Sasol.    
 
 
The skills constraint 
 
The third „distortion‟ is that the historical, systematic undermining of black 
education has limited the supply of skills and therefore hugely raised costs for 
manufacturing. Since 1994, what can generously be described as the „false start‟ 
in the rehabilitation of black education and artisanal training has continued to 
militate against competiveness in more labour demanding sectors. The most 
striking feature about the labour market in South Africa is not so much that 
wages of production workers are higher than competitors (although in many 
cases they are), but the exorbitant costs of managers and skilled staff. Based on 
detailed international survey data in manufacturing and some service sectors, 
Clarke at al (2007) found that unskilled workers in South Africa earned slightly 
less than in Poland but somewhat more than in Brazil. However managers‟ 
wages were 2.5 and 3 times higher than in Poland and Brazil respectively, and 
wages of professional and skilled employees in South Africa were also much 
higher than in the other two countries. A recent benchmarking study of the Thai 
and South African automotive industries came to similar conclusions. It found 
that the ratio of production workers‟ wages in South Africa compared to 
Thailand was nearly three to one, for professionals 6:1 and for artisans an 
incredible 12:1 (Benchmarking and Manufacturing Analysts, 2009). Even 
allowing for the possibility of higher qualification levels for skilled staff in 
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South Africa, these differentials create a huge competitive disadvantage for 
South African manufacturing.  
 
Major initiatives, such as the 1998 Skills Development Act, designed to address 
this problem have had limited success. This Act established Sector Education 
and Training Authorities (SETAs) funded by levies on wages. Many smaller 
companies who experience difficulty claiming back the levy perceive it to be an 
additional tax on employment.   
 
 
4. Conclusion: Reshaping comparative advantage 
 
So South Africa‟s „revealed comparative advantage‟ is, in part, the outcome of 
its distorted pattern of development. Powerful interests have coalesced around 
this capital and energy intensive growth path in support of what Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996) have dubbed the „mineral energy complex‟. Naturally they are 
opposed to any reduction in this support.
2
 While industrial policy has sought to 
shift industrial development onto a different trajectory, this has proved 
extraordinarily difficult and has met with limited success (Roberts and 
Rustomjee, 2009).    
 
But what does this mean in the South African context of high unemployment, an 
apparent lack of competitiveness in labour intensive sectors and a capital 
intensive export profile? This structural paradox has created a conundrum for 
industrial policy. Should policy encourage sectors which display revealed 
comparative advantage or attempt to create new areas of comparative advantage 
by encouraging higher valued added activities? Or is it possible to compete more 
effectively in more labour demanding activities? This conundrum partly 
explains the Department of Trade and Industry‟s adoption of a multiplicity of 
potentially contradictory policy objectives in support of beneficiation, the 
„knowledge economy‟ and labour absorbing growth.  
 
While industrial policy is sometimes narrowly defined as a set of selective 
interventions to promote industrial upgrading, we would prefer a broader 
conception – „improving economy wide efficiency.‟ In the South African 
context of large scale structural unemployment, this leads in turn to a focus on 
employment. Moreover, the bulk of our unemployed labour is unskilled or semi-
skilled and can most easily be absorbed into labour intensive activities.  As 
Business Day commented recently, “…we need to create jobs for the workforce 
we have, not the workforce we wish we had.” 
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It may be theoretically possible and sensible, especially in a mineral rich 
economy, to have an industrial policy which promoted capital intensive, 
resource based exports with employment being generated elsewhere in services, 
(protected) manufacturing for the domestic market or agriculture. Or industrial 
policy could target more advanced, leading sectors which may lead to little 
direct employment growth but which would generate the export expansion 
required to finance development with employment being generated in the 
protected sectors of the domestic economy. We argue, however, that industrial 
policy should be aligned with other policies and directly aimed at supporting 
more employment intensive growth.   
 
Government has very clearly stated the case for a more labour absorbing growth 
path – but an economy cannot efficiently shift its growth path without shifting 
its comparative advantage. To move to a more labour absorbing growth path, 
South Africa will need to compete more effectively in labour demanding 
economic activities. We are not suggesting that we can suddenly out-compete 
China in ultra labour-intensive manufactures and neither are we suggesting that 
South Africa should support, unsustainable, low margin activities. However, this 
competition cannot be avoided and for inroads to be made into the 
unemployment problem, South Africa needs to do much better than it has been 
doing. The playing field has been tilted towards energy and capital intensive 
firms and sectors – it needs to be tilted towards supporting employment and 
labour demanding growth.  
 
The question of incentives is crucial. By incentives we mean the whole panoply 
of prices, subsidies and regulations which face market participants. It has been 
shown that there has been a significant bias against employment as a result of 
South Africa‟s particular development experience. Growth has favoured capital 
intensive sectors and constrained labour intensive development. In part this has 
reflected differentiated support across various sectors. Factor prices are a second 
consideration. The relative prices of capital and labour do have an effect on the 
production techniques that are selected and also play a role in the growth 
strategy in terms of impacting on the growth path that an economy follows. 
Capital has been subsidised for very large capital intensive projects. Industrial 
support frequently takes the form of investment allowances and subsidies. The 
SETA funding for training on the other hand is derived from a tax on the payroll 
and in fact constitute a transfer from smaller, labour intensive firms to larger 
more capital intensive firms. A major set of subsidies has been energy. 
Electricity has been very cheap and especially cheap for large capital intensive 
users. Implicit and explicit energy subsidies to these sectors run into billions per 
year. So one key question is whether the incentive structure can be re-shaped to 
facilitate employment creation much more strongly.  
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The case for intervening directly to support employment intensive activities can 
also be made in the conventional economist‟s language of addressing market 
failure. Very high unemployment has major negative external effects. The 
resulting social dislocation creates huge costs for society. It imposes a tax on 
poor households, nearly all of which are supporting unemployed members. 
Higher employment would relieve this burden and lower household costs. 
Higher employment would also improve educational and health outcomes and 
reduce the cost of social services.   
 
But what of objectives such as technological upgrading, promoting the 
knowledge economy and moving up the value chain? These activities can and 
should be supported and may be complementary to labour absorbing growth in 
some ways. But in the end they constitute a limited development strategy in the 
South African context because a large section of the labour force is not equipped 
with the skills to be employed in these sectors. It can also be argued that higher 
employment and the growth in labour demanding activities is the best way of 
encouraging upgrading because income growth at the low end of the income 
distribution is likely to be the best way of improving educational outcomes and 
therefore creating a decent platform for vocational and tertiary education.  
 
Placing employment at the centre of industrial policy means support for small 
firms and training, particularly at a basic level and an examination of the 
regulatory environment. It also means providing appropriate infrastructure and 
investments to improve competitive capabilities in more labour demanding 
activities. This does not mean that wages should, be driven down although 
policy does need to investigate if there are labour market rigidities that need to 
be addressed here. Incentives should subsidise labour and training rather than 
capital investment, electricity and infrastructure for capital intensive firms. The 
challenge for South African industrial policy, therefore, is to tilt the playing field 
towards labour absorbing growth in order to mobilise the potential of an under-
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